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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Annulment Proceedings for Non-age (New York State). - In
England, the ecclesiastical courts assumed jurisdiction to decree the
annulment of the marriages of infants who were below the age of
consent. In this country, such courts did not exist. Hence, at -an early
date, courts of equity assumed jurisdiction; at the present writing, such
jurisdiction is controlled locally by statutory enactment.1
The state of New York modified its Domestic Relation law in 1922:
"A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto is under the
age of legal consent, which is eighteen years, provided that such
non-age shall not of itself constitute an absolute right to the an-
nulment of such marriage, but such annulment shall be in the dis-
cretion of the court which shall take into consideration all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the marriage."2
This statute is best explained in detail by Justice Dowling in Retan. v.
Mathewson3 where he states, in part:
"Annulment of a marriage for non-age is no longer a matter of
right, but rests now in the sound discretion of the court. Persons
under the age of 18 may now contract a valid marriage, and such
marriages will not be annulled at the mere desires of the parties."
In this decision the court rightly followed the land-mark case of Todaro
v. Todaro4 in which Justice Martin stated:
"It is obviously the intention of the legislature to abolish the
license afforded by the prior state of the law to permit persons
under 18 years of age to make trial marriages, which they could
repudiate without penalty. It recognizes that a marriage may be
validly contracted by a person under that age that public policy
dictates should be the standard age."
The law is further explained in Lazarezyk v. Lazarczyk:5
"No hard and fast rule has been laid down by which it can be
determined just when the discretion of the court sh6uld be exer-
cised in favor of an annulment and when it should not. The results
must be governed by the facts surrounding each case. The discre-
tion of the court should be moved by whether an advantage has
been taken of the plaintiff to entrap her into a relation that she
would not have assumed if endowed with more mature judgment."
A bulk of New York case law extends the discretion of the court in these
actions.6 Hence, from the authority cited we realize the substantive law
rights of infants married before one or both have attained the statutory
requirement of 18 years: the court may void or affirm the marriage at
1 Cunningham v. Cunninglham, 206 N.Y. 341.
2 Dom. Rel. Law of New York, Sec. 7.
3 226 N.Y.S. 85.
4 200 N.Y.S. 567.
5 201 * 816.
6 Smith v. Smith, 221 N.Y.S. 672, (1927), Retan v. Mathewson, 226 N.Y.S. 80,
(1927), Simmons v. Simnons, 203 N.Y.S. 215, (1924).
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its sound discretion. Another question arises from these rights - a
problem in adjective law, . .. May the parent of the infant successfully
sue for annulment, and is the consent of the infant to the proceedings
necessary?
At common law the right to annul the marriage on the ground of
non-age extended to the parties only. The United States has generally
adopted the English view - with the exception of two states: New York
and Oklahoma.7 Early New York cases accepted the English view. An
early decision8 emphatically demonstrates this:
"The marriage contracts of infants are not dependent upbn the
consent of their parents, and parents may not have them annulled.
It is only the infant who may maintain an action to annul his or
her marriage. The parents right to maintain such an action is
clearly in behalf of the infant .... The marriage contracts of in-
fants are not void but only voidable at the election of the parties
to the marriage. A parent or guardian is not such a party."
In 1915 New York's legislature accepted the Code of Civil Procedure -
forerunner to the present Civil Practice Act. Section 1744 of the original
code provided:
"An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one or both
of the parties had not attained the age of legal consent may be
maintained by the infant, or the guardian of the infants person,
or the court may allow the action to be maintained by any person
as next friend of the infant. But the action shall not be main-
tained at the suit of a party who was of the age of legal consent
when it was ocntracted, or by a party who for any time after he
or she attained the age freely cohabited with the other party as
husband or wife."
From a mere reading of the statute we can understand that the right
of the parent to bring suit under the circumstances is absolute, and not
conditioned upon the consent of the infant. As Justice Tuthill stated in
Kuykendall v. Kuylcendall:9
"A case can be conceived, however, where children of immature
years, under the age of consent and without judgment, might
marry and be unwilling to ask that a sentence of nullity be
granted as to their unwise act, yet under such circumstances a
parent would not only be justified but it would clearly be a moral
and parental duty to have the marriage annulled, and I believe
that the law has been formulated to meet such and similar exi-
gencies."
In the Kuykendall case, youngsters 15 and 17 years of age "eloped."
The parents of the 15 year old brought an action for annulment and
received judgment under the provision of section 1744 of the Code -
which is now section 1133 of the New York Civil practice act. The sec-
tion remains identically the same as it is set out on page 6' of this
7 New York: Kuycenda v. KuukcndaU, 182 N.Y.S. Oklahoma: Ross v. Bryant,
90 Okl. 800.
8 88 N.Y.S. 854, (1904).
9 112 Misc. Rep. 12, 182 N.Y.S. 308.
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paper. When the section was originally adopted by the legislature,
Throop - New York's famous jurist, had this to say:
"The annulling of the marriage may be a matter of such para-
mount importance to the infant and his parent that no technical
obstacles should stand in the way of the court to grant relief.
Sound social policy demands this change."1o
From the case and statutory law cited we may unequivocally state
the general proposition that in New York state a parent, guardian or
best-friend may maintain suit to annul the marriage of the infant to
whom it is related. Whether or not the case will be successful depends
absolutellr upon the discretion of the court which will weigh the circum-
stances carefully. Consent of the 'infant -to the proceeding is neither
necessary nor material, although the action must specifically be brought
in his or her name, and the parties to the marriage must be enjoined in
the action.11
On the several points discussed, New York law is crystal clear, but
sadly in the weak minority with Oklahoma.
William B. Lawless, Jr.
10 Thoops' Commentaries on Procedure, p. 354.
11 Fero v. Fero, 62 App. Div. 470.
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